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 Introduction 
Over the past decade, collaborative local institutional arrangements for the design of 
small-scale infrastructure, and cultural and natural resource sustainable management have 
emerged among numerous political jurisdictions and actors, embedded within multi-level 
governance structures and relations (see specifically, the Italian case on “negotiated 
programming”, De Vivo, 2004; Barca, 2005; Trigilia et al., 2005).  Specifically, European 
cohesion policies
1 are embedded in a multi-level governance  policy network, which has 
grown in parallel with European integration. Across Objective 1 Areas
2, partnership has been 
widened and deepened, and in certain cases it has developed beyond the Structural Funds. 
While partnership was conceived primarily as the vertical relationship between the 
Commission and national, regional or local authorities, the horizontal dimension of 
partnership – including a wide range of stakeholders at local, regional and national level – 
has grown over time (Mairate, 2006).  
Different actors, including resource users and government agencies try to work 
together to resolve shared dilemmas of coordination, as an increasingly common alternative 
to centralized institutions. Decision making power is delegated to territorial government 
agencies with the assumption that local agents possess both contextual knowledge and 
political legitimacy to integrate different policy measures in a cooperative fashion.  
Thus, problems of coordination and implementation of Structural Funds arise
3. Local, 
regional, and national governments, as well as private for-profit and non-profit organizations, 
                                                 
1 The European Structural Funds targeted at achieving greater economic and social cohesion and reducing 
disparities within the European Union (EU) have more than doubled in relative terms since the end of the 1980s, 
making development policies the second most important policy area in the EU.  
2 The majority of the development funds have been earmarked for Objective 1 regions, i.e. regions whose GDP 
per capita is below the 75 per cent threshold of the EU average. 
3 The revolutionary nature of the cohesion policy created a policy process that did not “fit” into any pre-existing 
approach to national regional policy. This lack of “fit” that requires substantial institutional adjustment and 
learning on how to use the policy has led some scholars to question the advantage gained by regional 
governments in participating in cohesion policy programs (Thielmann, 2002; Leonardi, 2005).  
  2strive to better share division of labor and coordination approaches to address old and new 
development challenges
4. 
This paper aims to examine the variety of ways in which regional government 
agencies may be mobilized, managed and co-ordinated with the private sector in order to 
stimulate local economies. The overarching question this study addresses is how coordination 
occurs across regional multi-objective EU-co-funded programs, which are embedded within 
multilevel governance structures and relations. The paper analyzes management techniques 
of local capacity building, network building, project development, monitoring and evaluation, 
highlighting also the rationale and impact of regional development policies and the role of 
institutions.  
Building upon the current international economics and neo-institutionalist literature 
and the recent public management scholarship, the study addresses the following research 
questions: 
1.  What formal and informal coordination mechanisms are adopted in European 
cohesion policies and programs specifically across four Italian Objective 1 Areas? 
2.  How do formal and informal coordination mechanisms evolve over time from 
design to implementation of EU Structural Funds across four Italian Objective 1 
Regions, and why? 
In particular, this paper examines coordination mechanisms that regional agencies 
have adopted to design and implement some specific European Union Cohesion Policy 
instruments carried out across Italy’s Objective 1 areas, namely, the so-called Integrated 
Programs (IPs). These are EU-co-funded newly introduced policy instruments, which are 
                                                 
4 According to ex post evaluation reports, effectiveness of partnership is linked to a clear delineation of roles 
and responsibilities, as well as a mutual, trust-based relationship between partners. The “Territorial Employment 
Pacts” provide a good example of effective partnership working. These initiatives add value to local 
development and employment generation by resource deployment at the local level; matching supply and 
demand; reduced administrative overlap; and encouraging the policies to be more clearly targeted (ECOTEC, 
2001; Mairate, 2006). 
  3distinctive for being multi-annual programming, multi-objective, public-private partnerships 
designed and implemented through collaboration of regional and local authorities.   
From a theoretical standpoint, this paper seeks to bridge both organizational and 
institutional perspectives with concerns for program management, hence developing an 
understanding of how program coordination occurs within different inter-organizational and 
inter-institutional settings. Empirically, the contribution of this  study consists of mapping 
and analyzing how European cohesion programs are coordinated as embedded within a  
multi-level governance environment
5. Structural Fund programs are complex to manage, due 
to the differences in organizational goals and structures, the distance involved, as well as the 
inability to use hierarchies, which help in internal organization management. From a 
normative perspective, this research, given the existing governance structures, identifies 
those coordination mechanisms that open up the opportunity for administrative change and 
innovation at the regional level. 
Besides scholars in regional studies, governance, and public policy, this study is, 
therefore, directed to policy makers, public managers, and evaluators keen to integrate 
effective coordination mechanisms into planning and systematic assessment of regional 
development programs. The features of specific formal and informal coordination 
mechanisms that managers prefer, the types and costs of coordination mechanisms perceived 
                                                 
5 In particular, the expected research results were the following: 
-  Classification of typologies of development programs and projects which are selected and implemented 
across some European Objective 1 regions; 
-  Preliminary assessment of EU cohesion policies and programs' outcomes with the identification of 
major critical areas and salient aspects for future improvement; 
-  Taxonomies of coordination and evaluation mechanisms which are adopted for selecting EU-co-funded 
development projects; 
-  Identification of recurrent problematic patterns of coordination and management during 
implementation of development programs both in regional and local public agencies; 
-  Typologies of organizational arrangements and governance structures associated with both successful 
and poor administrative performance; 
-  Analysis of performance systems and accountability lines; and 
-  Assessment of evaluation operating systems as coordination mechanisms. 
See Marra M. (2006) Research Progress Report, National Research Council, Research Promotion 2004 – Young 
Researchers. 
 
  4as most effective and relevant for development programs, and the factors affecting 
coordination over time are the key concerns of the research. Findings allow to reconstruct the 
role of coordination mechanisms as factors of organizational, institutional, and ultimately 
economic change.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 highlights the state reform discussion as 
the major theoretical issue that underlies debate on the role and functions of the state and 
public institutions for promoting economic growth and development. Section 2 classifies the 
various coordination mechanisms and presents an analytical scheme to understand their 
evolution over time across different organizational and institutional settings. After describing 
the study design and methodology in section 3, section 4 examines the key empirical features 
of IPs across the four selected regions, highlighting those performance indicators that 
delineate specific regional implementation and performance patterns. Section 5 identifies the 
coordination mechanisms at work across the four regional administrative contexts. Finally, 
section 6 concludes the analysis, underscoring the limitations of the study and raising both 
theoretical and practical implications for future research. 
 
The reform of the state in the background 
Over the past decade, public sector scholars, economists and policy makers have 
debated on how to improve the performance of public organizations and systems of public 
organizations because of the renewed emphasis on institutions as agents of development and 
growth (North, 1990; Putnam, 1992). We argue that the explanatory factors for institutional 
formation in complex economic, organizational and policy systems should be explained from 
multiple theoretical lenses. Various literature strands in social sciences contend different 
descriptive and analytical explanations and support sometimes competing normative frames. 
  5Two significant literatures in public administration and economic development have 
recently developed along remarkably separate tracks, despite their evident connections.   The 
first is a comparative literature on public management reform and modernization (Hood 
2000; Kettl, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Barzelay 2001; Bresser-Pereira 2001; 
Christiansen and Lægried 2002).  These works provide empirical and theoretical insight into 
why and how public management reform and modernization take place.  The second is a 
somewhat specialized literature on the European Union regional policies (Roberts, 2003; 
Diez, 2002; European Commission, 2001; Thielemann, 2000; Shaw et al. 2000; Roberts et al. 
1998) with a subset of econometric studies estimating convergence in economic growth 
across member states and regions and in the productivity of specific industries (Puga, 1999, 
2002; Boldrin, Canova, 2003; Barry, 2002, 2003; Destefanis, 2004; CELPE, 2005; Leonardi, 
2005). The latter reflects a wider scholarly movement to connect EU research with 
comparative policy-oriented research.  In particular, these contributions seek to assess the 
impact of Structural Fund Programs on economically lagging economies and overall on 
countries’ growth.  
The disconnected development of two previously cited literatures has, therefore, an 
obvious explanation: contributors to the first literature focus on state reforms and public 
organizations’ performance, while the European Union as well as regional and local 
administrative agencies are not a state, but complex, public organizations that interact with 
each other within a multilevel governance context. Conversely, contributors to the second 
literature focus on the EU policy design and impact and overlook issues of implementation 
within inter-organizational settings across different economic regions and political, 
institutional contexts.  
Indeed, it is still very difficult and controversial to estimate the impacts of Structural 
Funds, which are instruments to promote economic and social cohesion, but they do not act 
  6in isolation. They are intimately embedded in a wider, multi-level governance system that 
involves multiple actors and institutions (Hooghe, Marks, 2001).  Thus, institutional factors 
play a decisive role to explain different economic performances across structurally similar 
regions (Martin, 1998; De la Fuente, 2002), whereas econometric analyses leave unaddressed 
the institutional and organizational dimension of Structural Funds’ expenditure and 
absorption.  
Furthermore, as Leonardi (2005) notes, the importance of the EU’s cohesion policy is 
to be found in both its potential socioeconomic as well as its political-institutional impact. 
“The Treaties – Leonardi states – have emphasized in the past the socioeconomic objectives 
in increasing the production of wealth and better balance in well-being among the regions of 
Europe. But the objective of reducing socioeconomic disparities is not merely restricted to 
the economic field. It also reflects a basic political commitment to institutional reform in 
order to make public institutions and policy making more responsive to the needs of the 
electorate” (Leonardi, 2005: 87).  
Thus, there exists a gap in the understanding of how public agencies at different 
government levels design and coordinate development policies. In fact, the nature of 
Structural Fund Programs has substantively evolved over time and the system of governance 
applied to the administration of cohesion policy during the two programming (e.g., 1994-
1999 and 2000-2006) cycles was not uniform in all member states and regions. The learning 
curve varied for different levels of government and different regions within member states as 
is evident from the number of evaluation studies conducted on the implementation of the 
Objective 1 Programs and Community Initiatives (Leonardi, 2005). Furthermore,  Structural 
  7Fund Programs’ implementation has been increasingly devolved to regional and local 
government agencies through complex public-private partnerships
6.  
Many scholars have examined the benefits of collaborative coordination mechanisms, 
such as the capacity to adapt to the changing physical conditions of resources, to promote 
public participation and policy dialogue. While the potential benefits of collaborative 
resource management offer obvious incentives for stakeholders to come together, this is no 
guarantee that collaboration will emerge around a particular resource management dilemma, 
especially in settings where actors have held traditionally adversarial relationships (see, for 
instance, Martin, Pearce, 1999 on British local governance of European integration; see De 
Vivo, 2004, on Southern Italian case regading territorial pacts for employment).  
In some circumstances, collaborative institutional arrangements encourage consensus 
building offering all relevant groups the knowledge and skills needed to participate in these 
negotiations. In other circumstances, though, delegation of decision making power opens the 
door for opportunistic behavior, lacking vision and trust for mutual cooperation. Thus, a 
better understanding of the local, national and European modalities of Structural Fund 
planning and implementation, and some deeper knowledge of the variety of agents that 
constitute the governance of local and regional economies need to be developed.  
From a typical organizational perspective, different disciplinary approaches have 
highlighted such issues, building an organic and multidisciplinary body of theories and 
studies on public organizations. Economist, in particular, have pointed to the issue of 
efficiency and productivity, underscoring the role of institutional procedures, formal and 
                                                 
6 The system of governance applied to the administration of the cohesion policy is based on a number of 
management principles. These include the incorporation of principles involving “synergy” – that is, the explicit 
interaction between measure and actions within different sub-programs in order to increase the impact of the 
chosen projects; “additionality” – the co-financing of measures by different institutional actors (e.g., the EU, 
national and regional governments, and the private sector) to provide additional funding and increase the impact 
of the investments; “partnership” – the socioeconomic groups operating in the sector, and “transparency” – the 
need to make the activities of the program known to the public and open to public scrutiny. See Leonardi, R. 
(2005). 
  8informal incentives as those factors structuring administrative behavior (Simon, March, 1958; 
North,  1990; Powell, DiMaggio, 1991). Public choice economists within the tradition of 
Tullock or Niskanen have analyzed the principal-agent relations, rent-seeking and 
inefficiency existing within the public sector and how to overcome the negative incentives of 
large bureaucracies. Neo-Institutionalist have focused on public institutions, their historical, 
social, and customary features that justify inertia, formal and informal practices, processes of 
competition and isomorphism. Organizational theorists from a sociological background have 
underscored issues of power, conflict, motivation, values, and culture to understand 
organizational dynamics and learning processes. These literatures offer insights into 
organizational working but they do not tackle directly the issue of program and project 
coordination and management within and among organizations. In other words, there still 
persists an artificial separation between planning and implementation through administrative 
action.  
Instead, in order to understand the practical process and institutional implications of 
the form of multi-level governance associated with cohesion policies, decision-making and 
policy implementation need to be taken as a whole or as the result of a continuous policy. It 
serves no purpose, and, in fact, distorts a full understanding of the policy process if particular 
phases of decision-making (e.g., allocation of resources or the formulation of the plans) are 
analyzed separately from the rest of the process. In addition, decision-making cannot be 
divorced from the analysis of how policy implementation is carried out. In turn, the 
implementation of the policy needs to be carefully evaluated (in the form of an explicit ex-
post evaluation) so that the lessons learned from the previous policy cycle can be fed into the 
subsequent stage of policy formulation (Leonardi, 2005).  This means that when policies or 
programs are designed they need to be adapted to the specific features of territorial 
institutions, anticipating the potential dysfunctions of administrative working. This also calls 
  9for developing a conceptual/analytic approach to merge the institutional/organizational 
understanding with the program/project management perspective in order to better grasp the 
complexity of policy making within a multi-level governance system, as follows next. 
 
Coordination mechanisms at the fore front: Analytical scheme and affecting factors 
Recently, both a normative and positive distinct body of economics literature has 
begun to deal with programs and project coordination from an organizational perspective.  
The notion of coordination within organizations and between organizations and institutions 
has come to the fore to reconstruct how relations and interactions occur.  Two representative 
definitions of coordination follow:  
“integrating or linking together (of) different parts of an organization 
to accomplish a collective set of tasks” (Van de Ven, Delbecq and 
Koening, 1976: 322) 
 
“it [coordination] means that different agents working on a common 
project agree to a common definition of what they are building, share 
information, and mesh their activities. To build the project efficiently, 
they must share detailed design specifications and information about 
the goals and actions.. In sum, they must coordinate their work so that 
it gets done and fits together…” (Kraut and Streeter, 1995 ; p. 69). 
 
Coordination differs from control. Coordination focuses on managing 
interdependencies among multiple individuals or activities involved in the overall task 
(Crowston, 1997,  Kraut and Streeter, 1995).  Control focuses on improving performance 
relative to a certain overall goal (e.g., organizational goal) when the goals of individual 
stakeholders (e.g., employees) differ from those of the larger overall entity (e.g., the 
organization) (Henderson and Lee, 1992,  Kirsch, 1996,  Mantei, 1981).  Both coordination 
and control streams of organizational literature primarily focus on internal planning. In 
contrast, this paper focuses on regional development programs, which are difficult to 
  10manage, due to the differences in organizational goals and structures, the distance involved, 
as well as the inability to use hierarchies which help in internal management.  
Coordination and control are both important issues in multi-level governance 
development programs. However, the two streams of literature are quite different in terms of 
the problems studied, the theories employed, and the ways of classifying the mechanisms. In 
fact,   control and coordination are usually viewed as opposites, describing one attribute of 
structure as “the extent to which the information exchange is for coordination vs. control 
purposes.” In order to avoid the undue complexity that would arise from examining both 
coordination and control of regional programs and projects, this paper focuses on one aspect, 
i.e., coordination mechanisms; unlike control mechanisms, coordination mechanisms have 
not been examined specifically for EU-co-funded structural fund programs. 
According to this analytic approach, coordination consists of managing 
interdependencies among multiple individuals, organizations, and institutions involved in the 
overall program management. Organizational linkages seek to connect various management 
functions, though these linkages oftentimes do not fine-tune across different levels of 
administration (Goodman, 2000). For instance, the evaluation function has come to be 
understood as a distinctive coordination mechanism that aims at improving future 
performance relative to certain organizational goals by systematically assessing past 
performance. Yet, in practice evaluation findings and recommendations may not be 
integrated within the day-to-day management decisions but only considered for strategic 
planning (Marra, 2003, 2004b). This mismatch between organizational functions and 
management practices may hinder change at all levels of the organization.  
Several studies classify different types of coordination mechanisms, including 
standards, hierarchy, targets or plans, slack resources, vertical information systems, direct 
contact, liaison roles, task forces, and integrating roles. Other ways of classifying 
  11coordination include formal impersonal, formal interpersonal, and informal interpersonal 
(Kraut and Streeter, 1995); non-coordination, standards, schedules and plans, mutual 
adjustment, and teams (Adler, 1995); task-task, task-resource, and resource-resource 
coordination; vertical and horizontal coordination; coordination by programming and by 
feedback (March and Simon, 1958,  Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koening, 1976 ); and 
coordination by standards, plans, and mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967,  Kumar and van 
Dissel, 1996).  
Tab. 1 – Tipology of coordination mechanisms  
Types of coordination 
 
Mechanisms of coordination  References 
Standard Compatibity  standards 
Data dictionaries 
Design rules 




Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
Adler (1995) 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
 





Code inspections Cronogrammi 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
Adler (1995) 








Status review meetings 
 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 
DeSanctis e Jackson (1994) 
Adler (1995) 
Adler (1995); Kraut e Streeter 
(1995) 
Galbraith (1974); Van de Ven et 
al. (1976) 
Argyris, Schon 
DeSanctis e Jackson (1994) 






Joint development  
Transition teams 
 
Kraut e Streeter (1995) 






Source: Sabherwal (2003) 
 
After considering these classifications, coordination mechanisms were classified into 
four broad types—standards, plans, formal mutual adjustment, and informal mutual 
adjustment. This classification builds on the classifications used by  Thompson  (1967) and 
 Kumar and van Dissel  (1996) by incorporating  Kraut and Streeter  (1995) distinction 
  12between formal and informal mechanisms. Fig. 1 summarizes this classification scheme, and 
Tab. 1 identifies several coordination mechanisms of each type. 
Mechanisms that seek coordination through standards and plans rely on a priori 
specification of codified blueprints, action programs, or specific targets (March and Simon, 
1958,  Thompson, 1967). They are impersonal in nature as once they are implemented, their 
application does not require much verbal communication between participants (Galbraith, 
1974,  Galbraith, 1977). These mechanisms generally have high fixed costs (for setting up the 
mechanism) but low variable costs (for each application of the mechanism). In contrast, 
coordination mechanisms involving mutual adjustment use interpersonal interaction to make 
changes based on information obtained during the project (March and Simon, 1958, 
 Thompson, 1967). Being more interactive in nature, they incur higher variable cost but lower 
fixed cost. Informal mutual adjustment differs from formal mutual adjustment in that the 
adjustments are made in a more structured and formalized fashion. Informal mutual 
adjustment may therefore be more related to team interdependence, while formal mutual 
adjustment may be more related to reciprocal interdependence. Also, informal mutual 
adjustment mechanisms would incur greater variable costs but lower fixed costs than 
mechanisms involving formal mutual adjustment; the latter seek mutual adjustment in a more 
structured fashion, and therefore require the delineation of mutual adjustment mechanisms. 
This analytic scheme makes it possible to understand how specific coordination 
mechanisms evolve and what costs – e.g., fixed or variable – they give rise to, highlighting 
that there does not exist the best coordination mechanism. Rather coordination is worked out 
by all different actors involved within the policy process. The question then arises as to what 
factors do, indeed, affect the evolution and change of coordination mechanisms over time. 
 
 
  13Fig. 1 – Classification of coordination mechanisms 
 
 
Based on prior literature, four factors were identified as potentially affecting 
coordination of multi-actor programs and projects. Three of these factors—efficiency, equity, 
and relational quality—were based on prior literature on interorganizational relationships 
(Ring and van de Ven, 1994,  Arino and de la Torre, 1998), while the fourth—uncertainty—
is based on the literature on coordination within organizations (Daft and Lengel, 1986). Ring 
and Van de Ven view evolution of interorganizational relationships as depending on the two 
sides’ perceptions of efficiency and equity. As indicated in the transaction cost economics 
literature, efficiency considerations pertain to the benefits from the particular governance 
structure relative to others available for undertaking a transaction (Ring and van de Ven, 
1994 ). Thus, within the context of participatory, bottom-up projects, efficiency would reflect 
the benefits obtained from participation, in terms of timely and within-budget programming 
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Source: Sabherwal (2003) 
  14Equity, in contrast, concerns fairness in the dealings between the various sides, 
requiring reciprocity but not necessarily equality (Blau, 1964,  Ring and van de Ven, 1994). 
In development projects, equity would be reduced through perceived opportunistic actions by 
the different local actors partaking in the design as well as perceptions that the regional party 
is not adequately performing its expected role. Arino & de la Torre suggest that a third factor, 
relational quality, along with efficiency and equity considerations, influences the evolution 
of interorganizational relationships. Relational quality depends on personal bonds between 
participants from all sides, their trust in each other, their reputations for fair dealing, and their 
previous contributions to the relationship (Arino and de la Torre, 1998,  Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). Therefore, relational quality would be enhanced in development 
projects by prior interactions between the regional government and the local actors as well as 
similarity of language and culture. Whereas prior literature on interorganizational 
relationships has recognized the importance of these three factors, their effects on 
coordination mechanisms have not been explicitly examined.  
Prior literature on coordination identifies uncertainty (i.e., lack of information), as an 
important factor influencing coordination mechanisms. As uncertainty increases, horizontal 
channels and group meetings increasingly replace impersonal coordination (Adler, 1995, 
 Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koening, 1976). A study of the effectiveness of impersonal, 
personal, and group coordination mechanisms under different conditions found that “as task 
uncertainty increases, horizontal channels and group meetings are substituted for, or 
increasingly replace, the impersonal mode of coordination” (Van de Ven, Delbecq and 
Koening, 1976 ; p. 329). In addition to uncertainty, prior coordination literature also 
examines the effect of equivocality (i.e., existence of several conflicting interpretations) in 
the relationship (Daft and Lengel, 1986), but this aspect was not considered separately in this 
study since it is closely related to the relational quality attribute discussed above. 
  15 
Study design and methodology 
This study focuses on the specific organizational settings of Structural Fund Programs 
across four Italian Objective 1 regions (namely, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise 
Regions) because of a number of opportunities and circumstantial reasons. First and 
foremost, Structural Fund Programs are inherently development programs across different 
geographical and contextual conditions and the aim of the present study is to highlight key 
governance aspects of development from an organizational/institutional standpoint. Secondly 
and relatedly, IPs are implemented within Objective 1 Areas, which are economically lagging 
regions belonging to a Southern European member state. Administrative behavior and 
performance are presumed to show not only the typical backwardness traits, but also, and 
more importantly, the traditional features of Latin, Mediterranean institutions, where the 
administrative law highly structures the functions of public agencies. Thus, it is undoubtedly 
interesting to reconstruct administrative behaviour across the four selected regions to detect 
change and innovation breaking with their path-dependent patterns.   
Third, owing to common EU-imposed procedures
7, IPs present manifold similarities 
in terms of designing, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation. Yet, there are irreducible 
differences as far as political legitimacy, and constituency, economic structure and 
performance of regional and local public agencies across the four different regions 
considered. The similarity, therefore, is a workable construct inasmuch as it takes into 
account the difference. Third,  
                                                 
7 According to Council Regulation 1260/1999, with regard to implementation, IPs need to follow the EU rules 
and procedures on: (1) the way funds need to be managed and in choosing the beneficiaries or targets for the 
intervention; (2) the control and oversight to be exercised on the implementation of the programs, measures and 
projects; the monitoring and reporting on the progress o programs over time; (3) the evaluation of the impacts of 
the programs on local and regional socioeconomic conditions; and (4) finally, the certification of the completion 
of the projects and the provision of final payment (Leonardi, 2005). 
 
  16The research unfolded along two phases, in order to address the two previously 
mentioned research questions –namely: 1. What kind of coordination mechanisms are used in 
IPs, and why? And 2. How do these mechanisms evolve over time during a project, and why? 
In the first phase (Oct. 2004-Sept. 2005), a quantitative analysis was developed through the 
collection of data on Structural Funds' committed and actually disbursed expenditure across 
four Italian Southern Objective 1 Regions – that is, Campania, Calabria, Basilicata and 
Molise
8.  Additional information was also gathered regarding the themes of development 
programs implemented as well as the types of public investments chosen (that is, 
infrastructure; human capital formation; business start-ups and support). Furthermore, data 
was collected to reconstruct the patterns of organizational/institutional arrangements adopted 
at the regional and local level to implement Structural Fund Programs. The aim was to build 
a cross-sectional database, including a range of EU Structural Fund Programs designed and 
implemented within the four above-mentioned Italian Objective 1 Areas, taking stock of the 
different institutional architectures that have been developed thus far.  
In the second phase (Oct. 2005 til Feb. 2006), the research adopted a qualitative 
methodology building upon multiple case studies. These case studies do not focus on specific 
IPs but rather on regional governments’ institutional structures, procedures, and coordination 
mechanisms actually put in place to carry out IPs. The unit of analysis is, therefore, regional 
agencies’ behavior and performance rather than the specific integrated projects’ design and 
implementation.  The rationale consists of identifying those institutional factors and 
coordination processes at play across economically lagging regions
9. The aim is to glean 
empirical evidence of administrative change on a regional scale and participatory decision-
                                                 
8 The first three regions belong to the Objective 1 Areas,  whereas Molise Region is currently phasing out. 
9 As previously suggested, the system of governance applied to the administration of cohesion policy during the 
two program cycles was not uniform in all member states and regions. The learning curve varied for different 
levels of government and different regions within member states as is evident from the number of evaluation 
studies conducted on the implementation of the Objective 1 Programs and Community Initiatives (Leonardi, 
2005.  
  17making practices modifying regional agencies’ relations to local authorities
10.  Variation 
among cases allows for the assessment of similar patterns emerging across different contexts. 
The specificity of cases and methodology do not prevent from arriving at generalizations 
applicable to other institutional conditions.  
In this phase, fieldwork was an essential component of such a “policy research”, 
which required to investigate into the nature and origins of problems that public policy aims 
to solve (Meade, 2005). “Field research” means inquiry into programs or policies through 
direct contact, such as by interviewing clients or staff, observing operations, reading 
government documents, or inspecting program data. Field research emphasizes unstructured 
learning about a program, as well as serendipity, discovering the unexpected and it is guided 
only to a limited extent by prior hypotheses (Meade, 2005). Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted to gather opinions and perceptions on how Structural Fund Programs are designed, 
and what and why institutional and organizational arrangements are chosen. Interview data 
collection aimed to substantiate the interpretative category of coordination mechanisms with 
four samples of informants to be able to triangulate different perspectives, perceptions, 
opinions, and descriptions
11.  The interview data, along with the contents of the 
documentation and the social science literature review, were analyzed vis-à-vis the three 
dimensions of the study's analytical architecture: that is, (a) state reform; (b) institutional and 
administrative working; and (c) coordination and evaluation within the conceptual framework 
                                                 
10 Case studies were then developed according to the following analytical codes: (i) features of coordination 
mechanisms, (ii) interviews' perceptions on cooperation, (iii) actual examples of cooperation, (v) change in 
practices or policies associated to different coordination approaches at the regional level. Case studies were 
cross-sectionally analyzed. The pattern matching technique was adopted to search for patterns of data, detect 
correspondence with theoretical assumptions, and draw tentative conclusions.  
11 The samples of informants included: (a) regional decision makers/managers, (b) local/project managers, (c) 
evaluators, and (d) experts such as economists, environmental engineers, and public sector specialists. First, 
regional decision makers were interviewed to gain insights on how they design structural fund programs, 
choosing different patterns of coordination for decision making and implementation. Second, program managers 
were interviewed to understand which governance factors are associated with formal and informal coordination 
mechanisms they use for program implementation. Third, evaluators were interviewed to grasp the intended use 
of the evaluation studies they conduct and to reconstruct how evaluation can play as a coordination mechanisms 
for management and decision making. Finally, experts were interviewed to gather their comments on the 
technical aspects of policy areas and themes 
  18as laid out above. Specifically, respondents' comments, opinions, and perceptions of change 
were interpreted as mechanisms of coordination and cooperation
12. 
 
Key features of IPs across four Southern Italy’s regions 
The innovativeness of IPs relies, first of all, on the multi-sector-based approach as 
opposed to the traditional mono-sector-based intervention. Measures to protect environmental 
goods are complemented with interventions to promote human resources and vocational 
training, while infrastructure building is sought to be integrated with specific firms’ subsidies 
across different industrial settings. IPs are, therefore, umbrella programs that include several 
more specific projects in different sectors whose rationale revolves around a well-articulated 
idea of socioeconomic development of the territory.  Tab. 2 and 3 indicate the number of IPs 
approved by the four regional governments as well as the number of interventions all IPs 
include as a whole. 
Secondly, regional governments delegate their decision making power to local 
institutions to integrate different policy measures in a cooperative fashion. Delegation of 
decision making power is therefore presumed to minimize the unintended or conflicting 
outcomes emerging, for instance, when environmental protection and infrastructure building 
are not designed consistently to local contextual needs nor are these pursued through a 
cooperative effort of local networks of actors. Indeed, regional and local governments share 
the responsibilities for designing and managing IPs.  
These policy experiences build on local partnerships, and more or less explicitly aim 
to produce intangible or relational public goods (trust, social capital, cooperation, 
stakeholders and beneficiaries’ involvement), community empowerment, and good 
                                                 
12 Although all interviews were confidential, background information will be collected for all interviewee 
samples, including their position and length of time in the agency, prior work experience, education, 
professional field, and political orientation. All interview notes taken during the interview sessions were coded 
and analyzed. 
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environmental sustainable management, vocational training, business start-up and support as 
well as delocalization as shown in Tab. 4.  
Tab. 2 – No. of approved IPs per region and their stage of advancement 
  No. of approved IPs  Ex ante evaluation and 
monitoring 
Implementation 
Basilicata 8    8 
Calabria 23    1 
Campania 51  51  39 
Molise 7  7  7 
Source: Elaboration on data by ISFOL (2005) 
Tab. 3 – No. of interventions and allocations across IPs 












Total amount of specific 
 Structural Funds allocated to IPs 
(Thousands of euros) 






(min. 20 – 
max 190) 
 
239.504 59.991 18.277 317.773 
Calabria 1027  36   
(min. 12 –  
max 61) 
23 496.701  96.715  89.492  682.908 
Campania 1395  41   
(min. 8  - 
max. 190) 
42 1.322.772    185.689  1.508.462 
Molise 207    35 45.817  10.564  6.068  62.450 
Source: Elaboration on data by ISFOL (2005) 






Infrastructure Other  Tot. 
Basilicata 63.7  7.2  28.9  0.2  100 
Calabria 28.9  34.3  34.8  2.0  100 
Campania 16.2  30.3  53.5      100 
Molise 79.2  14.0  6.8      100 
Source: Elaboration on data by ISFOL (2005) 
As the data show, Campania has significantly relied on IPs during the current EU 
structural funds 2000-2006 programming cycle. In this region, IPs are 51 and represent about 
40 percent of the total Structural Funds allocated thus far. Calabria follows with 22 IPs 
  20reckoning about 23 percent of total Structural Funds. Campania and Calabria, moreover, 
show very close percentages of territorial coverage, concentrating respectively the 30 and 34 
percent of IPs across municipalities with 50.000 and 100.000 inhabitants (see Tab. 5). By 
contrast, Molise and Basilicata show almost the same absolute number of programs 
approved, allocation of total Structural Funds, and percentages of territory covered by IPs. 
This suggests that there are some patterns emerging out the four regions: Calabria and 
Campania present extensive adoption of these newly introduced policy instruments, which 
has been supported by political leadership and accompanied with intense informational 
campaign and distinctive rhetoric. By contrast, seemingly due to their smaller size, Molise 
and Basilicata include a much lower number of IPs and a significantly lower amount of 
financial allocation vis-à-vis the total amount of Structural Funds. Tab. 7 encapsulates how 
the four regions (with the exception for Campania) have divided up their territory to allocate 
IPs according to the specific socioeconomic vocation and needs.   
Tab. 5 – Percentage of IPs per dimension and per region 
 Up  to  50.000 
inhabitants 
50.000 – 100.000 
inhabitants 
100.000 – 250.000 
inhabitants 
Beyond 250.000 
Basilicata  62.5 25.0 12.5  
Calabria  34.8 30.4 34.8  
Campania  15.6 34.4 18.8 31.3 
Molise      
Source: Elaboration on data by ISFOL (2005) 
Also similar across the four regions considered are the institutional arrangements, which have 
been chosen to design IPs as well as their territorial organization. At the regional level, 
representation is assured by the political body in Molise; the Department for Cohesion in 
Campania; and the Steering Committee in Calabria and Basilicata. Coordination is, instead, 
entrusted with the central unit of coordination in Calabria; the Coordination committee in 
Molise; the Partnership agreement and the territorial coordinator  in Campania. The 
management is left with the regional responsible for Structural Funds in Campania, Molise, 
  21and Basilicata; with the Unit for IPs in Calabria
13. Management, as shown in Tab. 6, should 
unfold through negotiated practices. In other words, it is supposed to be shared between the 
regional administration and the local authorities. 
Tab. 6 – Patterns of territorial distribution, management and evaluation modes 





Basilicata 8  areas  Negotiated  Negotiated 















Source: Elaboration on data by ISFOL (2005) 
 
  Although there seems to be some convergence across the various officially labelled 
institutional arrangements and  the formally assigned coordination responsibilities, there 
exists much deeper difference in the way these are carried out in practice. Tab. 7 reconstructs 
the extent to which regional governments have implemented the various projects and 
activities included within IPs. The number of tenders carried out as of March 2006 witnesses, 
in fact, the capacity of regional responsible in collaboration with local authorities to select 
private actors and other public entities eligible for receiving funding; hence, this is the first 
step of actual implementation.  
As is apparent, the number of IPs, which are currently being implemented is very low, 
confirming the weak absorption capacity Italian Objective 1 Areas have demonstrated 
                                                 
13 Based on interviews with regional managers and ISFOL data (2005). 
  22throughout the two Structural Funds programming cycles
14. This key research finding points 
to the relevance of practical coordination occurring from the very early phases of the IPs 
design to explain how and why this poor performance result has come about. 












Basilicata  2  1     17     20 
Calabria        3  2   3  8 
Campania 13  19 27  3     62 
Molise 1  28  11      1  41 
Source: Marra, Diluca, Federico (2005) 
 
Coordination mechanisms at work 
In this section, we seek to identify what coordination mechanisms have been 
employed in the design and early implementation phase of IPs across the four regions 
considered. Factors affecting mechanisms are also examined to understand how and why 
coordination changes over time.  
Coordination mechanisms’ mix: The design of IP builds on a mix of coercive and 
voluntary mechanisms: within the financial cap the regional government authoritatively set 
for each type of IP, plus all disbursement and control procedures (according to Council Reg. 
1260/99).  Institutional agents come to an agreement or a contract to fix what projects and 
how much of resources can characterize the IP.  
                                                 
14 The literature on Europeanization has attempted to define the possible reactions to the decentralization 
process from a theoretical as well as analytical perspective. Borzel and Risse (2003) look at the domestic 
response to Europeanization as a reaction to a basic lack of fit between domestic structures and European 
requirements: “Europeanization must be ‘inconvenient’, that is, there must be some degree of ‘misfit’ or 
incompatibility between European-level processes, policies, and institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-
level processes, policies, and institutions, on the other”. They argue that the response to the inconvenience of 
Europeanization has a number of possible consequences. It can lead to changes in the domestic opportunity 
structures, the redistribution of power among domestic actors, the capacity of actors to exploit opportunities and 
avoid constraints, and bring in new actors into the Europeanized policy process (Borzel, Risse, 2003; Leonardi, 
2005). 
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schedules in time with EU official delivery deadlines, the IP requirement specifications in 
terms of leadership and management, signed off the project for approval, and issues 
invitations to tender (Molise, Campania, Basilicata). 
Coordination by formal mutual adjustment: Local agents formulated IP project 
milestones, and specified the requirements for project selection; designed their formal review 
meetings; established their internal “hierarchy” by recognizing the specific role of the leading 
institution or project manager; and periodically reported to the regional administration 
representatives (i.e., the evaluation unit).  
Coordination by informal mutual adjustment: Local actors held several informal 
meetings to elaborate the specific characterization of the IP and decide who was supposed to 
do what. In one case a support development agency acted as a transition organization for 
summoning and managing the local forum. Lots of telephone calls were reported by 
interviewees as modes of effective, day-to-day coordination during the peaks of IP design 
phase. Local actors came to share a selection grid to single out projects to be included within 
IPs. 
There was considerable agreement across interviewees with respect to the factors 
affecting coordination.  Efficiency and equity seemed to produce a combined (mutually 
reinforcing) effect on coordination because of some sort of overlap between perceptions of 
equity (i.e., perceived lack of effort) and efficiency (i.e., perceived low output).  Most 
interviewees agreed on the synergistic potential of the integrated approach in terms of 
increased consistency across policies as opposed to monosectoral intervention. Yet they were 
also highlighting the danger of some sort of “sectoralization” of IP. Agents were also 
pondering benefits and costs associated to the exchange and to the collaborative process as 
opposed to individual planning. Some reported that the whole process was time consuming 
  24and too much political, with a concrete danger of losing focus and inadvertently favoring 
opportunistic behavior.  Indeed, efficiency considerations changed very little since there was 
no reliable information on project performance. The overall perception was that IPs were just 
juxtapposing policy measures rather than integrating them.  Equity considerations changed 
following what one party perceives as opportunistic behavior or unilateral actions by the 
other party, so there should be more effort to build trust among parties. 
Uncertainty was a key factor. A specific source of uncertainty was related to the new 
procedures the regional evaluation units had set up for IP assessment. Local actors 
participating in the forum were to fill a specific form indicating the economic and social costs 
and benefits, specific objectives, expected results, and operational agreed upon process, 
output, and outcome indicators. Uncertainty also led to learning both in terms of the 
understanding of regional and EU political priorities,  organizational structures, operational 
procedures. Overall, uncertainty increased following decisions regarding project management 
after the design phase. Uncertainty also increased as a result of efficiency problems, leading 
to unclear specifications or poor documentation.  
Relational quality: overall the perception was that the relational quality improved a lot 
as the design process unfolded through interpersonal, dense relationships, while it begun to 
fade once IP was approved, the project was expected to be implemented. Relational quality 
changed during the course of the project design with improvements in relational quality 
through the parties getting better acquaintance with each other, and risked to deteriorate due 
to uncertainty in management and implementation responsibility.  There should be more 
effort in continuously feed it through more informal adjustment.  
The only significant differences among interviewees were with respect to equity as to 
whether all parties made an equitable contribution to the IP or there was just opportunism. 
(This difference is consistent with the agency theory argument the principal would then be 
  25more vulnerable to opportunism by the agent). Regional and local perspectives differed also 
with respect to the evolution of coordination mechanisms. Regional managers, who are 
obviously more experienced with EU procedures, did not feel vulnerable to opportunism by 
local actors, but, and possibly because, they prefer to go into the projects with greater 
preparation, as reflected in their greater emphasis on more formal mechanisms (standards, 
plans, and formal mutual adjustment) early in the project. Regional responsible use some 
informal mutual adjustment mechanisms during analysis and design and later during 
implementation but prefer to have minimal informal mutual adjustment during the 
intervening development phase. In contrast, the local political actors, who have less 
experience with these programs, enter the program without emphasizing either formal or 
informal coordination mechanisms. This, as indicated above, might reflect the program being 
sold to them as a “partnership”. Later in the program, they sought increased informal mutual 
adjustment when they developed a better recognition of their vulnerability or when the 
program run into problems.    
 
Concluding remarks  
The paper has presented an analytical scheme (see Fig. 1) of the way in which 
coordination mechanisms might evolve.  This scheme, showing the factors affecting 
coordination mechanisms, suggests that events during the program/project may cause 
changes in perceived uncertainty, efficiency, equity, and relational quality, and those changes 
might, in turn, cause changes in coordination mechanisms. Uncertainty and efficiency 
seemed important throughout the program/project, although the nature of their impact seemed 
to change. Early in the program/project, greater efficiency (e.g., large benefits from 
cooperation and policy measures’ integrated) seemed to increase coordination, but later in the 
project, coordination increased from perceived reduction in efficiency (e.g., problems with 
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including learning by participants or poor specifications developed earlier. Equity 
considerations seemed not to influence coordination initially, but they became important 
later, usually following unilateral actions or perceived opportunism. Relational quality 
seemed very important throughout, and its effect on coordination seemed consistent over 
time; initial investments in relational quality reduced coordination, while a later decrease in 
relational quality (which resulted with the “regionalization” of tendering procedures and 
responsibilities) led to greater formal coordination. Finally, the cases suggest that initial 
actions during the project have major long-term consequences. As regional agencies and 
local political actors enter the IPs’ relationship, they start observing each other through the 
mechanisms they have created. They watch each other for clues about reassessment, such as 
unexplained divergence between expected and actual behavior, which might cause concerns 
about the other party’s competence or fairness, or affect the quality of the relationship. 
Unless the two sides have worked with each other frequently in the past or their motives are 
above suspicion, early events in the relationship might have a disproportionate effect on later 
stages of the project.  
When interpreting the findings several limitations of the research should be 
recognized. First, most projects were examined from either the regional government or the 
local agencies’ perspective. First and foremost, the major limitation is related to the 
specificity of the case studies as context-, and topic-sensitive. Each program is unique and 
any analysis on coordination is inherently related to the existing, specific institutional and 
organizational arrangements, culture, practices, human resources, pattern of past performance 
and strategy for the future. Furthermore, the topics of the case studies are not neutral. What is 
concluded as far as formal and informal coordination, the change occurred, and the policy 
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qualitative methodology of the research. Perceptions and opinions, though relevant, are 
specific to interviewees' experience, understanding, beliefs, culture, and context.  
Despite these limitations, this study has several implications for future research. 
Further research is needed to identify other coordination mechanisms, other ways in which 
coordination mechanisms might evolve, and other factors that influence coordination. For 
example, the stage of the project itself seemed to influence coordination, although its effect 
was not examined in detail here. Many instances showed informal mutual adjustment 
(especially through personal visits) to be greater during the early (analysis and design) and 
late (financial reporting and evaluation) phases, but less during the middle (development and 
implementation) phase. Such further research may benefit from additional case studies of IPs. 
Further research is also needed to examine the extent to which this paper’s findings, 
including the types of coordination mechanisms used as well as their evolution during the 
programs and projects, can be generalized to other situations. These include other Structural 
Fund Programs, other kinds of institutional and political situations, and administrative 
procedures. Future research may also compare the coordination mechanisms used in IPs with 
those used in regular EU-co-funded, mono-sector-based projects, which do not involve ad 
hoc organizational arrangements, and considerations of equity and relational quality may be 
considered less important.  Another potentially useful area of future research is empirical 
exploration of the differences observed between regional and local perspectives. 
Questionnaires using quantitative measures of the various constructs, as well as additional 
case studies comparing regional and local perspectives on the same project would provide 
further insights into these differences.  
  28Furthermore, the concepts of uncertainty, efficiency, equity, and relational quality 
also need further investigation in the context of IPs. Future research may develop measures 
of these constructs and then use questionnaire surveys at multiple points in time to examine 
changes in these three aspects as well as the coordination mechanisms. Finally, future 
research should examine the complex organizational processes through which the 
coordination mechanisms are adopted or discarded. This research has provided a preliminary 
model of the evolution of coordination mechanisms. Future exploration of the evolution of 
coordination would benefit from such processual perspectives as organizational learning and 
interorganizational dialectics, and from focusing on cognitive, symbolic, and political factors 
that influence the evolution. Longitudinal cases would be most appropriate for examining 
such dynamics of coordination. 
The paper also has several implications for practice. Regional and local executives 
involved in other EU-co-funded projects might benefit from the insights it provides into the 
perspective of the other party in the relationship. Regional executives may consider giving 
greater attention to coordination mechanisms, and especially to the more formal mechanisms, 
early in the project, so that the more costly informal mutual adjustment does not become 
essential later. Local should also seek the benefits of expertise with IPs’ development early in 
the project; if the round table has prior technical, and administrative experience, it should be 
actively involved in the initial negotiation process and if the political group is not so 
experienced with analysis and evaluation it would a good idea to seek the assistance of 
external consultants. Regional executives, on the other hand, should seek ways of preventing 
the increase in uncertainty and the perceived drop in efficiency, equity, or relational quality, 
which apparently motivates local demand for increased informal mutual adjustment. 
Investing in relational quality, avoiding actions that may be perceived by the local actors as 
  29unilateral or opportunistic, and managing expectations so that performance problems do not 
come as a complete surprise, were some of the tactics that seemed effective in the cases 
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